Review of “Two paths to prosperity”
I just finished reading “Two Paths to Prosperity: Culture and Institutions in Europe and China, 1000-2000” by Avner Greif, Guido Tabellini, and Joel Mokyr. The book, as suggested by the title, is a study of comparative economic history. My reading of economic history is limited to reading biographies of Marx and Keynes. My reading of Chinese history is limited to the 20th century. My reading of European history is more extensive, so it was of considerable interest to me to find a single book that compared the economic histories of Europe and China (with brief digressions on the Muslim middle east and India).
As the authors observe, “An informed observer in AD 1000, watching European, Chinese and Islamic societies, would never have bet on Europe to emerge as the technologically and economically dominant civilization eight centuries later.” The main idea of this book is that China and Europe diverged in so many dimensions during the second millennium CE because of the very different cultural and social foundations of their societies. Indeed, Europe not only overtook China, but China stagnated—despite having enjoyed a far more advanced state in AD 1000—while Europe surged ahead.
The book documents how the roots of what they call the “Great Reversal” or “Great Divergence” between the economies of Europe and China already existed in the Middle Ages, even if they did not lead to the emergence of a discernable gap in living standards until after the Industrial Revolution. They show that at the turn of the millennium, China and Europe had developed different value systems: kinship loyalty in China, universalistic values in Europe. China’s model was based on patrilineal extended clans, placing maximum trust in kin distrusting strangers. Europe’s model was based on a nuclear family and tended to be more successful in creating a civil society in which strangers frequently interact.
China had a communitarian value system based on clans. Clan membership was based on a patrilineal ancestor and was ascriptive (based on kinship). In contrast, Europe developed a universalistic value system based on what the authors term “corporations” (e.g., fraternities, guilds, universities, churches, self-governing cities, etc). Corporation membership was a choice, based on shared interest. Individuals in China belonged to a single clan, while people in Europe could join several corporations active in different domains.
Ultimately, the authors make the case that the European system had the positive externality of encouraging new and iconoclastic ideas and venues in which they could be shared and competed. In contrast, the Chinese system based on Confucianism bonds of kin solidarity valorized social norms of loyalty, affinity to common ancestors, a strong sense of belonging, continuity and stability that tended to make the culture insular and solipsistic. As the authors note:
“. . . belonging to a corporation is primarily transaction, weighing benefits and costs, whereas communitarian types see their extended family as an identity, satisfying their need to belong, as well as a source of benefits from cooperation.”
The premise of this book is an antidote to the anti-immigration xenophobia of Stephen Miller. It documents how Europe’s embrace of immigrants, intellectual commerce between strangers, freedom of movement and competition for skills and talent between cities and states and led to growth and innovation, while China’s Confucian commitment to orthodoxy and the status quo made for a geopolitically anachronistic society that valorized clans and kinship over cosmopolitanism, resulting in stagnation.
Overall, I found the book engaging and informative. I felt like a better editor could have trimmed some of the repetition and made a shorter and more tightly focused narrative. This is one of those books that is a bit technical for a popular history and a little lightweight for an academic audience. But if you enjoy history and how it impacts society, you will probably enjoy this book.
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